We use Transparency International's ratings of self-reported anticorruption efforts to analyze factors underlying the ratings. Our tests examine whether these disclosures reflect firms' real efforts to combat corruption or are cheap talk. We find that the ratings are related to enforcement and monitoring, country and industry corruption risk, and governance variables. Controlling for these effects and other ratings determinants, we find that firms with lower residual ratings have higher subsequent citations in corruption news events. They also report higher future sales growth and show a negative relation between profitability change and sales growth in high corruption geographic segments, but not in low corruption segments. The net effect on valuation from sales growth and changes in profitability is close to zero. The findings are robust to a number of sensitivity tests, including analysis of disclosures for a larger sample over multiple years. We conclude that, on average, firms' disclosures signal real efforts to combat corruption.
I. INTRODUCTION
C orruption is increasingly viewed as a significant impediment to economic development. 1 A recent World Bank survey of more than 150 leading public officials and citizens from 60 developing nations cited corruption as the number one factor hampering their countries' economic development and growth. Recent estimates of the magnitude of corruption also indicate its severity. For example, Mexico Transparency estimated that in 2007, Mexicans paid 115 million bribes amounting to $175 million for 35 services that should have been free. An Integrity Watch Afghanistan study indicated that in 2009, the average Afghani citizen paid $156, or 31 percent of the average per capita income, in bribes. The World Bank estimates that bribes paid by individuals and firms to the public sector amount to $1 trillion per year globally, and that the cost of corruption equals more than 5 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) ($2.5 trillion).
Largely because of data limitations, research on corruption has focused on its country-level causes and consequences. Country factors are certainly important in learning about corruption. But our understanding is also likely to be deepened by studying the phenomenon at the firm level, where many questions remain unanswered. In this study, we examine some of those questions using Transparency International's (TI) ratings of corporations' self-reported strategies, policies, and management systems for combating corruption. Our sample comprises 480 of the world's largest corporations.
Because the ratings reflect firms' decisions to report anticorruption activities and not their actual efforts, it is unclear whether they reflect anything other than cheap talk. 2 In addition, ratings may be noisy signals of firms' disclosures given the lack of consensus about which policies effectively deter corruption and questions about the consistent application of TI's rating criteria across companies. To learn more about firm reporting on anticorruption efforts and the quality of the ratings, our tests investigate the association between firms' anticorruption ratings and corruption risk, monitoring, and governance variables. We then examine whether the ratings are related to subsequent media allegations of corruption and to subsequent financial performance in high and low corruption-risk geographic segments.
We argue that firms' disclosed anticorruption efforts are likely to be influenced by corruption norms in their home countries and industries, and in the non-domestic markets where they choose to operate. What is less clear is whether these country and industry factors increase or decrease firms' anticorruption efforts. Do firms that have elected to operate in high corruption countries and industries undertake and report more anticorruption efforts or, given the perceived realities of doing business in these countries and industries, do they opt for weaker policies and systems and/or engage in cheap talk?
Anticorruption efforts are also expected to be associated with regulatory monitoring and enforcement. Although corruption is illegal in virtually all countries, enforcement varies markedly. In addition, non-U.S. firms that choose to list in the U.S. subject themselves to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) standards and enforcement, increasing their potential legal risk from enforcement actions. We predict that firms subject to stronger anticorruption enforcement are more likely to adopt and report stronger efforts to combat corruption.
Finally, we examine whether anticorruption disclosures are associated with effective governance. Managers of firms with independent and engaged board oversight may take anticorruption laws and enforcement seriously and adopt/enforce policies to deter corruption. Alternatively, some investors, boards, and managers may jointly view corruption as an unavoidable cost of doing business in certain parts of the world, yet engage in cheap talk in an effort to reduce regulatory costs.
Our results show that many of the above variables are related to the anticorruption ratings. Firms with higher reported anticorruption efforts are from less corrupt home countries and operate in higher-risk industries. They are more likely to operate in home countries with stronger enforcement of corruption laws, cross-list in the U.S., have experienced a recent corruption enforcement action, employ a Big 4 auditor, and have a higher percentage of independent directors. These findings are robust to inclusion of control variables that have been shown to be associated with the quality and quantity of firm disclosure.
We then examine whether anticorruption ratings are related to subsequent corruption-related news events and financial performance. To control for the risk, enforcement, and governance factors discussed above, which are also likely to be correlated with subsequent corruption risk and financial performance, we use residual ratings. This allows us to disentangle whether differences in subsequent corruption allegations or financial performance reflect variation in firms' disclosed anticorruption efforts or, for example, differences in their industry and country risk exposures.
Firms with higher residual ratings have fewer media mentions in articles about corruption in the next three years, consistent with such firms having stronger anticorruption controls that are effective in lowering corruption risk. Alternatively, firms with lower residual ratings may invite additional media scrutiny, increasing the likelihood that corrupt behavior is detected and reported.
Tests of subsequent financial performance indicate that in high corruption geographic segments, firms with lower residual ratings have significantly higher subsequent three-year sales growth. In contrast, in low corruption geographic segments, there is no such association between future sales growth rates and residual ratings. A difference-in-differences test indicates that the difference in three-year sales growth for low and high residual rated firms in high and low corruption geographic segments ranges from 12.3 percent to 15.9 percent.
However, profitability tests show a negative relation between three-year changes in return on equity (ROE) and sales growth in corrupt geographic segments for firms with low residual ratings, but not for those with high residual ratings. No such difference is found in low corruption geographic segments. To understand the combined sales growth and ROE effects on equity value, we compare the impact of differences in ROEs and sales growth on theoretical value-to-book equity multiples for firms with high and low residual ratings. The results indicate that, on average, the sales growth and ROE effects are offsetting, and there is little discernible valuation difference for the two subsamples.
One interpretation of this finding, which is consistent with anecdotal evidence from the Siemens corruption case (see Healy and Petkoski 2009) , is that weaker corruption controls and enforcement allow lower residual rating firms to generate higher sales growth in high corruption markets. Yet, bribes are costly (3 percent of sales in the case of Siemens). The low ROEs on incremental sales in high corruption markets for low residual rating firms imply that these costs are not fully recovered through higher prices on corrupt contracts or through scale economies from increased sales.
An alternative explanation is that the correlations between residual ratings and sales growth/ROE reflect omitted variables in the ratings models that are correlated with performance in corrupt countries. This concern is exacerbated by our having only one year of data, restricting us to using a levels analysis. In addition, since our sample contains the largest firms in the world, it is not clear whether the findings generalize to smaller firms. To address these concerns, we conduct a series of sensitivity tests, including analysis of a less comprehensive set of anticorruption disclosures for more than 2,000 firms around the world over ten years. The levels findings for this sample are similar to those reported for the main sample. This dataset also allows us to perform a first-differences analysis by constructing a sample of 71 firms with material increases in anticorruption disclosures. We compare these firms to a matched control group of competitors with weak disclosure. Consistent with the levels results, we find that the treatment firms reported lower three-year-ahead sales growth in corrupt countries, and had a more positive relation between future sales growth in corrupt countries and future profitability.
In terms of the question of whether self-reported anticorruption efforts reflect a genuine commitment to combat corruption or are merely cheap talk, no single test provides conclusive evidence. But our findings show that firms with high ratings are more likely to purchase costly forms of monitoring from high-quality auditors, subject themselves to costly enforcement from U.S. exchanges and courts, and emanate from home countries where anticorruption laws are more effectively enforced. Further, they generate lower medium-term sales growth rates in more corrupt geographic segments. Together, these findings suggest that the TI ratings represent firms' actual disclosures, and are not simply noise. Further, since many of the actions and performance associated with anticorruption disclosures are costly, we conclude that our findings are more consistent with disclosures reflecting firms' actual anticorruption efforts rather than cheap talk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses prior research on corruption. Section III describes the data and empirical tests. Our findings are presented in Section IV, and conclusions in Section V.
II. PRIOR RESEARCH ON CORRUPTION
Academic research on corruption has typically focused on studying its macro causes and consequences. These studies conclude that corruption has an adverse effect on a country's economic performance, lowering its GDP per capita, foreign investment, and economic growth, and increasing social inequality. 3 Corruption appears to be related to a complex set of political and regulatory factors, such as the size of the public sector, autocratic government, weak regulations, and lower economic competition; 4 cultural variables, like low levels of generalized trust, non-Protestant populations, and greater acceptance of hierarchy; 5 and geographic and historical influences, such as the abundance of natural resources, corruption among neighboring states, and distance from the world's major trading centers. 6 Recent studies have examined corruption from the perspective of firms and individuals. Studies of firms conclude that organizations are more likely to pay bribes when they employ a local partner in high-risk countries (Spencer and Gomez 2011) and when they have low bargaining power (Svensson 2003) . Firm studies have also examined the consequences of corruption in a variety of settings. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) show that firm growth is constrained in countries where there is corruption among bank officials. Khwaja and Mian (2005) find that politically connected firms in Pakistan received more loans and had higher default rates than unconnected firms. Di Tella and Franceschelli (2011) find that Argentinian newspapers are less likely to report government corruption on their front page if they generate more government advertising. Weitzel and Berns (2006) show that takeover premiums are lower for targets in corrupt countries, and interpret this as evidence of acquirers being price-protected against any incremental risk or lower profits associated with the deal. Lyon and Maher (2005) document that U.S. firms that reported paying bribes prior to the FCPA faced higher audit fees, consistent with bribery increasing monitoring costs. Kwok and Tadesse (2006) examine whether MNCs influence corruption in countries in which they operate. The authors hypothesize that this can arise from MNC home country regulations that penalize MNCs caught engaging in corruption, and host country businesses learning about the costs of corruption from MNCs. Consistent with this hypothesis, they find that corruption is negatively related to past foreign direct investment. 3 See, for example, Hall and Jones (1999) ; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón (1999) ; Knack and Keefer (1995) ; Rock and Bonnett (2004) ; You and Khagram (2005) ; Anoruo and Braha (2005) . 4 See, for example, Elliott (1997) ; Di Tella (1997, 1999) ; Adsera, Boix, and Payne (2000) ; Montinola and Jackman (2002) ; Gerring and Thacker (2005) . 5 Studies include, among others, La Vishny (1997, 1999) ; Uslaner (2004) ; Treisman (2000) ; Lipset and Lenz (2000) ; Anderson and Tverdova (2003) . 6 Studies include, among others, Ades and Di Tella (1999) ; Leite and Weidemann (1999) ; Sandholtz and Gray (2003) ; Gerring and Thacker (2005) ; Swamy, Knack, Lee, and Azfar (2001) .
However, despite the useful insights generated by these previous studies, our level of understanding of why different firms exhibit different attitudes toward corruption and the consequences for their performance is still relatively low.
III. SAMPLE, ANTICORRUPTION RATINGS, AND EMPIRICAL TESTS

Anticorruption Ratings
Our data on company anticorruption disclosures come from Transparency International (TI), a non-governmental organization that monitors and reports on corporate and government corruption. Founded in 1993 and based in Berlin, TI is funded by government agencies, multilateral institutions, foundations, private sector companies, and individuals. It operates independent local country chapters charged with tackling corruption in their home countries. Each year, TI publishes the Corruption Perception Index (which polls analysts, business people, and country experts) and the Global Corruption Barometer Report (which surveys ordinary citizens across the world) on public sector corruption by country. In 2009, it published a report on the anticorruption efforts of multinationals (Transparency International 2009). Based on data collected in 2007 for 500 companies domiciled in 32 different countries, the report rated companies' disclosed anticorruption efforts and published aggregate results for different company home countries and sectors. 7 The specific rating system used to assess a company's anticorruption efforts for use in the study is presented in the Online Appendix (see Appendix A in this article for the link to the downloadable Online Appendix). The areas covered were based on an anti-bribery code developed by TI in collaboration with leading companies and other stakeholder groups. The information is separated into three categories: strategy (valued at 10 points), policies (valued at 15 points), and management systems (valued at 25 points). Strategy information covered whether a firm disclosed an anticorruption policy, its membership in anticorruption initiatives, and the extent of its application of the policy. Policy information included company disclosure of policies prohibiting facilitation payments and the giving and receiving of inappropriate gifts by employees, as well as the regulation and transparency of political contributions and lobbying. Finally, management system disclosures covered information provided on requirements for business partners to comply with the company's anticorruption efforts, anticorruption training for employees and business partners, whistleblower and help systems for employees, systems to monitor corruption breaches and to act against employees involved, and key performance indicators to track complaints, actions taken, and the extent of corruption-related training. TI investigators allocated half of the total points to management systems because they regarded these as more credible and effective than the policy and strategy categories, which could more easily be classified as public relations. 8 A highly rated company typically had a code of ethics and an anti-bribery code, was a member of one or more anticorruption initiatives, had explicit policies prohibiting bribery and kickbacks, provided clear guidelines on the giving and receiving of gifts and political contributions, was transparent about lobbying activities, communicated and provided training on its policies to employees and agents, had a robust reporting system in place with protection for whistleblowers, regularly reviewed its policies and acted on breaches, and reported a range of key performance indicators.
Sample
TI's initial sample comprised 500 leading firms from Forbes' March 2007 Global 2000, including the largest 250 listed companies, 107 companies from high-risk sectors, and 143 companies from the top 25 global exporting countries. Companies eligible to be added from high-risk sectors comprised the largest 40 oil and gas firms, the largest 40 companies in basic materials (including forestry and mining), the 20 largest aerospace and defense firms, and the largest 20 firms in each of the capital goods, construction, telecommunications, and utilities sectors. Eligible companies from the 25 largest global exporters (as defined by the World Bank in 2005) included a minimum of 40 companies from the three largest exporting countries (United States, Germany, and Japan), at least 30 companies from the next three largest export countries (China, France, and the United Kingdom), at least 20 from the next three largest export countries (Italy, Canada, and The Netherlands), ten or more from the 10th to 20th largest exporting nations (excluding Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and Singapore, which had less than ten companies listed in the Forbes Global 2000), and at least five companies from the 21st to 25th largest export countries.
Of the initial sample of 500 firms, 14 were eliminated by TI because they were no longer listed, were a holding company of another company included in the analysis, or there was inadequate information in English or the local language to adequately evaluate their efforts. We eliminate six more companies because of data unavailability, leaving a final sample of 480 firms. Table 1 , Panel A presents the distribution of the initial sample firms by country, and Table 1 , Panel B shows the distribution by sector. Twenty-five percent of the sample firms are from the U.S., 8 percent each from Japan and Germany, and 6 percent each from the U.K., France, and China. In total, 31 countries are represented. Comparing these numbers to the contribution of each country to world GDP in 2007, U.S., U.K., and French firms are slightly over-represented, while Chinese firms are underrepresented. Industries heavily represented, each with 10 percent, include banking, basic materials, and oil and gas. Other industries with substantial presence in the sample are capital goods, chemicals, construction, telecommunications, and utilities.
To construct the ratings for each of the 480 sample companies, TI investigators examined their public documents available prior to June 2007 (corporate websites, annual reports, and sustainability reports). TI investigators did not collect information from the company's intranet or internal systems. For further information on the ratings methodology, see Transparency International (2009).
Summary statistics on the aggregate scores for the sample companies are reported in Table 2 . The maximum score for any single company is 50. The mean score is 16.9 and the median 19, implying that most of the sample companies disclose less than 50 percent of the anticorruption factors included in the TI rating system. However, there is significant variability in corporate disclosure of anticorruption efforts. The first quartile score is 3.75, implying that more than 25 percent of the sample firms discloses almost nothing. In contrast, the third quartile score is 26.
Factors Associated with Anticorruption Ratings
Our first test examines factors that are associated with firms' anticorruption ratings. These include (1) factors representing regulatory enforcement and external monitoring of business practices associated with corruption and bribery, (2) factors that reflect inherent corruption risk, (3) governance factors, and (4) a variety of controls.
Regulatory Enforcement and Monitoring Variables
We hypothesize that there will be a positive association between TI ratings and regulatory enforcement and monitoring variables, either because the ratings reflect deliberate decisions to adopt a portfolio of policies designed to lower anticorruption risks, or because they reflect cheap talk. 9 The specific variables used to reflect the strength of regulatory enforcement and monitoring are as follows.
Big 4 auditors. To protect their own reputations and litigation risk, Big 4 audit firms are expected to demand stronger anticorruption standards and disclosures by the companies they audit. Consequently, we predict that the anticorruption ratings will be positively related to Big 4 audit firm selection. The Big 4 audit variable is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the sample firm has a Big 4 auditor at the end of 2006, and 0 otherwise. We collect this data item from Worldscope.
U.S. listing by non-U.S. firms. Non-U.S. firms cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ, or trading public debt in the U.S., are required to adhere to the U.S. FCPA and are subject to U.S. enforcement of the Act, which has historically been the strongest in the world. Indicatively, the United States pursued 75 percent of all foreign bribery enforcement actions between 1977 and 2011. Such firms are, therefore, expected to have reported strong efforts to combat corruption to avoid the regulatory costs of enforcement actions. U.S. listing is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the sample firm is a non-U.S. firm that is listed as an American depository receipt (ADR) firm on the NYSE or NASDAQ, or trades public debt in the U.S. at the end of 2006, and 0 otherwise. 10 We collect this data item from Worldscope and Capital IQ.
Home country enforcement. Companies from home countries that actively enforce anticorruption laws are expected to demonstrate that they have strong policies in place to protect against the risk of bribery and to reduce the penalties that they could face from any enforcement actions. Home country enforcement is measured by the number of prosecutions in the home country in 2005 and 2006, deflated by its share of world exports (representing its economic importance). 11 We obtain these data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) enforcement report on bribery and corruption. 12 Prior enforcement actions against a company. Companies that have faced prior enforcement actions for bribery or corruption are expected to have higher ratings, since they are likely to have developed anticorruption policies in response to the 9 For example, in determining whether a firm has violated the FCPA and the magnitude of any penalties, U.S. regulators assess whether the firm has anticorruption policies and procedures in place. As a result, firms with exposure to the FCPA might be more likely to have standard boilerplate anticorruption policies. 10 The second most active enforcer was the United Kingdom, with 5.1 percent of the cases. For more information, see the TRACE Global Enforcement Report 2011 at: http://www.ibe.org.uk/userfiles/globalenforcementreport2011.pdf 11 Frequency of enforcement actions against corruption tends to be very persistent over time at the country level and, as a result, including data for previous years yields very similar results. However, we expect that firms' anticorruption efforts will be influenced more by the current enforcement environment in each country. 12 For countries not included in the OECD enforcement report, we searched using TI expertise for enforcement actions. We found no enforcement actions.
Our results are robust when we exclude firms from these countries.
prior actions and to be more conscious of the costs of corruption. Prior enforcement actions is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a firm was prosecuted for corruption before 2007, and 0 otherwise. We obtain these data from TI.
Corruption Risks
We also hypothesize that firm anticorruption ratings will be related to the inherent risks from operating in countries and industries with high corruption risk. However, it is difficult to predict ex ante whether this effect will be positive or negative. Firms that operate in high corruption countries or industries could opt for extensive self-reporting of their anticorruption efforts to communicate their commitment to internal and external stakeholders and reduce risks, or as part of a public relations effort. Alternatively, such firms could provide little information on their efforts to avoid drawing attention to potential corruption risks and to increase employees' flexibility to negotiate in difficult markets. The specific variables used to reflect exposure to corruption are as follows. Industry risk. A company's exposure to corruption is likely to be determined by the industry in which it operates. Industries that negotiate with governments or sell products and services to government customers are considered high-risk. As identified by TI, these include oil and gas, basic materials (including forestry and mining), defense, capital goods, construction, telecommunications, and utilities sectors. These industries score the highest on TI's Bribe Payers Index (BPI), which measures the supply of bribes in different sectors. We measure industry risk by constructing an indicator variable that takes the value 1 for firms whose primary area of operations is in one of these sectors, and 0 otherwise.
Home country corruption rating. The level of home country corruption is likely to be an important factor in determining a firm's inherent risks of corruption and bribery, and to influence its anticorruption efforts and transparency. Home country corruption is the 2006 World Bank corruption rating for sample firms' country of origin. 13 Weighted average host geographic segment corruption ratings. Outside their home country, the sample firms typically operate in a variety of geographic segments with differing corruption risks. For each sample company, we collect data on geographic segments from Worldscope and Capital IQ. In cases where geographic segments are reported as regions rather than countries, corruption ratings for each region are computed by weighting the 2006 World Bank corruption ratings for the countries that make up the region by the countries' relative GDP. We then compute the weighted average rating for all host geographic segments for a firm by weighting each segment rating by its share of total company sales in host countries/ regions. (continued on next page)
Governance Variables
Finally, corporate boards are responsible for overseeing firms' internal controls and compliance programs, including those related to deterring corruption. We hypothesize that firms with effective board governance are more likely to have high ratings, either as part of their anticorruption efforts or to reduce regulatory costs. Consistent with prior research, we measure governance effectiveness by board independence and engagement. The specific variables are as follows. 14 Percent of independent board members. Prior research (e.g., Baysinger and Butler 1985) has measured board independence by the percentage of directors classified by the board as independent. Independent directors are defined as those who have not worked for the company as an officer, employee, or consultant, and have no other relationship with the company that the board perceives might impair their judgment. Data on the percentage of independent directors on the board in 2006 are collected from Bloomberg.
CEO-Chairman duality. Boards with a single person serving as Chairman and CEO are perceived to be less independent than those with separate Chairs and CEOs (see Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell 1997; Rechner and Dalton 2006) . By concentrating power in a single individual, duality reduces the checks and balances of effective governance. Data on CEO-Chairman duality in 2006 are collected from Bloomberg and used to construct an indicator variable that takes the value 1 for firms with CEO-Chairman duality, and 0 otherwise.
Board meeting attendance. Finally, boards that have a higher level of director attendance of board meetings are perceived to be more active and engaged, leading to improved governance (Sonnenfeld 2002) . Data on the percentage of directors attending board meetings in 2006 are collected from Bloomberg.
Control Variables
Finally, we include a variety of control variables that other studies have found to be related to firm disclosure policies. Firm size. If there are economies of scale at the firm level in developing anticorruption systems, then larger firms are more likely to have higher ratings than smaller counterparts. Of course, the TI sample comprises many of the largest firms in the world that should all be able to take advantage of any economies of scale. We obtain data from Worldscope and measure firm size by the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of 2006. 15 ROE. Prior disclosure studies conclude that self-reporting increases with profitability (see Healy, Hutton, and Palepu 1999; Miller 2002) , suggesting a positive relation between anticorruption ratings and ROE. In addition, sales reps at more competitive (and, hence, less profitable) firms may be more at risk for paying bribes to generate internal sales targets and achieve bonuses. It is unclear a priori whether such firms respond to this risk by enhancing or de-emphasizing anticorruption 14 We also tried including other variables of governance quality, such as board size, women on the board, and board age. The sample decreased further when we included these variables and none of the governance variables loaded in the specification with a significant coefficient. 15 Using sales or market capitalization as a measure of firm size yields qualitatively similar results. efforts. Therefore, we include firm return on equity (ROE) in the model, but without a prediction of its relation to anticorruption efforts. ROE is net income deflated by beginning-of-year shareholders' equity for 2006, and we obtain the data from Worldscope.
Closely held ownership. Prior research (Eng and Mak 2003) has found that firm disclosure is related to its ownership structure. Closely held ownership is measured by the percentage of shares held by investors that own at least 5 percent of the shares at the fiscal year-end of 2006, and we obtain the data from Worldscope and Capital IQ.
Diversification. Bens and Monahan (2004) find evidence consistent with highly diversified firms providing more disclosure, which they argue facilitates monitoring. Given the industry and international diversification of many of the sample firms, we control for these effects. International diversification is the percent of a firm's sales outside its home country divided by total sales for fiscal year-end of 2006. Industry diversification is the number of industry segments that the firm operates in, calculated using two-digit SIC codes as reported by Worldscope and Capital IQ.
Analyst following and forecast error. Lundholm (1993, 1996) find that firms with more disclosure have higher analyst following and lower absolute forecast errors. To control for this effect, we calculate analyst following as the number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts for a firm during the 2006 fiscal year. Forecast error is the absolute difference between actual EPS and consensus forecast EPS calculated one month before the fiscal year-end of 2006. We divide the absolute difference with stock price at the end of 2005 to normalize the error for scale differences across firms. We obtain the data from I/B/E/S.
Quality of accounting standards. Prior studies have found that firms following U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) or international financial reporting standards (IFRS) have more comprehensive disclosures, with both standards considered high-quality. We construct an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm follows U.S. GAAP or IFRS in 2006, as reported by Worldscope.
Home country disclosure. Countries differ in terms of disclosure regulations. While we are aware of no specific disclosure regulations around anticorruption systems, firms domiciled in countries with greater disclosure requirements are likely to provide additional information on their anticorruption efforts. We use the country disclosure variable calculated by La Porta et al. (2006) for each sample company's home country as a measure of the extent of country disclosure requirements.
English reporting. Although TI employed multilingual investigators, it is possible that the scores of some companies with primarily non-English disclosures are downward-biased. In addition, English-speaking countries tend to place a greater emphasis on transparency (see La Porta et al. 2006) . Therefore, we include as a control an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if English is the primary language used in a company's reporting, and 0 otherwise.
Descriptive statistics for the above variables are presented in Panel A of Table 2 . The sample firms are large and highly profitable. The median firm has assets valued at $30 billion, 16 is followed by 20 analysts, and has a return on equity of 25.3 percent. 17 It operates in four business segments, 18 and generates 34 percent of sales outside its home country. Forty-five percent operate in high-risk industries, 89 percent have a Big 4 auditor, and 34 percent list as an ADR in the U.S. Twelve percent of the firms in the sample had recent corruption enforcement actions. On average, the sample companies' host countries are more corrupt than their home countries. In terms of governance, on average, 68 percent of the sample firm's directors are independent, 39 percent have CEO-Chairman duality, and there is an 87 percent director board attendance rate. Seventy percent of the sample firms report their accounting information in accordance with IFRS or U.S. GAAP, and 46 percent have English as their primary language to communicate information. Table 3 reports univariate correlations between the variables. Anticorruption ratings are strongly positively correlated with Big 4 auditor, high-risk industry, home country corruption, accounting standard quality, home country disclosure standards, English reporting variables, board independence, and CEO duality, and negatively related to the percentage of closely held shares and board meeting attendance. The estimates also indicate that there is a high correlation between a firm's industry, home country, and host country corruption risks.
Anticorruption Ratings and Subsequent Corruption News Events
Our second test examines whether anticorruption ratings are associated with subsequent corruption news events that cite the sample firms. We control for factors that influence firms' anticorruption activities and disclosure, such as the industries and countries in which they operate and their disclosure propensity. Absent such controls, it would be difficult to disentangle whether differences in corruption allegations reflect variation in firms' anticorruption ratings, or differences in their industry and country risk exposures, monitoring, enforcement, governance, and transparency. Therefore, we use residuals of the selfreporting model, which denote abnormally high or low reported anticorruption ratings, as our primary independent variable. 16 Calculated as the exponent of 17.24. 17 The relatively high ROE is a characteristic of really large firms, but also of the large number of financial institutions in our sample. 18 Calculated as the exponent of 1.39. This variable is, by construction, orthogonal to the country, industry, and firm-level variables that are included in the selfreporting model.
To measure corruption news events, we screen all articles that are categorized by Factiva as related to ''Corruption,'' ''Bribery,'' or ''Financial Crime'' for each of the years 2007 to 2010. The search covers articles from both English and non-English sources and identifies many articles in non-English languages. 19 We focus only on articles from ''Major News and Business Publications'' to increase our confidence that the allegations have some credibility. 20 From this set, we identify articles All variables are defined in Table 2 . 19 To assess the impact of including non-English media sources on our findings, we replicate the tests using only sample firms from English-speaking countries. The findings are similar to those reported below for the full sample. 20 We exclude newswires to avoid inflation of the variables due to mechanical dissemination of articles. that cite a sample company. One concern with this metric is that sample companies mentioned in articles on corruption may not be accused of wrongdoing, making our measure a noisy one. To evaluate this concern, we read a random sample of 50 articles. Among these, 44 (88 percent) included allegations of corruption by sample firms, and only 6 (12 percent) made no such allegations.
Because corruption news events are likely to be sticky, our analysis for years 2008-2010 controls for prior corruption news from 2007. As reported in Panel B of Table 2 , the average number of corruption-related articles that cite a sample company is 11.5 in 2010, 8.2 in 2009, and 10.4 in 2008. Half of the sample firms are cited in no corruption-related articles and 25 percent are cited in more than five articles.
Given wide differences in media coverage across sample firms, our tests control for overall media interest in the sample companies. Therefore, we identify the number of ''Major News and Business Publications'' articles that mention each sample company from 2008 to 2010, generating an average number of articles per company of 2,804 in 2010, 2,522 in 2009, and 2,437 in 2008 (see Table 2 , Panel B). The resulting model to test the relation between corruption allegations and prior anticorruption efforts is as follows:
CorruptArticles it is the number of media articles on corruption in year t (t ¼ 2008, 2009, and 2010 for the dependent variable, and t ¼ 2007 for the independent variable) that cite a sample firm. Res_AC i , 2007 is the firm's residual anticorruption disclosure rating in 2007 generated from the disclosure prediction model discussed in the previous section. TotalArticles it is the total number of media articles citing the company in a given year.
We expect that sample firms' residual ratings will be negatively associated with future media corruption news (i.e., b 1 is negative), either because the ratings capture effective efforts to combat corruption or because they affect scrutiny of firms' business practices by the business press. Companies cited in corruption news events in 2007 are expected to take actions to reduce any adverse effects of those charges, implying that corruption media citations will exhibit a mean reverting pattern and that b 3 will be positive and less than 1.
Anticorruption Ratings and Subsequent Performance
Finally, we examine whether firms' residual anticorruption ratings are associated with subsequent performance. We use residual ratings as our variable of interest to control for risk, enforcement, and governance factors that are likely to be correlated with both corruption policies and financial performance. Residual anticorruption efforts are constructed to be orthogonal to the factors included in the self-reporting model. In addition, the tests use a difference-in-differences approach to compare differences in sales growth rates for firms with high and low residual anticorruption ratings across low and high corruption geographic segments.
If ratings reflect actual policies and enforcement efforts to combat corruption, then firms with high residual ratings are expected to grow more slowly than peers with low residual ratings in corrupt geographic segments, since they are less likely to sell to corrupt customers. Alternatively, if ratings merely reflect cheap talk, then there will be no association between residual ratings and growth in high corruption geographic segments.
The relation between residual anticorruption ratings and sales growth rates in low corruption geographic segments depends on whether firms with high anticorruption efforts generate incremental customer trust and, as a result, faster sales growth in those segments, or whether there is no such reputation effect. Again, if ratings reflect only cheap talk, then we expect no relation between residual ratings and sales growth rates in low corruption geographic segments.
The relation between residual anticorruption ratings and profitability is also difficult to predict ex ante. If firms with high residual ratings generate lower sales growth in corrupt geographic segments and, as a result, are unable to take advantage of economies of scale, then their profitability will decline. Yet, such firms could also show lower costs because they do not pay bribes. U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ 2008) allegations against Siemens reported that, on average, the costs of bribery paid by the company on a sample of corrupt transactions amounted to 3.2 percent of sales. 21 Moreover, the unintended consequences of fostering a corporate culture that tolerates corruption and bribery are potentially severe. Corrupt companies could face increased costs and lower revenues due to damaged corporate reputation and goodwill, employee theft, product quality and safety concerns, and inability to attract top human capital. Therefore, we make no a priori prediction about the relation between residual ratings and profitability.
To estimate the relation between subsequent sales growth rates, profits, and residual anticorruption efforts, we compute the following variables.
Geographic segment sales growth rates. Sales growth rates for the sample firms' geographic segments are computed for the three-year period from 2008-2010, which is subsequent to the date the anticorruption efforts variable was constructed. We collect segment sales data from Worldscope and Capital IQ.
Geographic segment corruption risk. We use two approaches to classify geographic sectors as clean or corrupt. The first classifies segments relative to the median 2006 World Bank corruption rating for all available countries. This approach maximizes the difference between the high-and low-risk classifications, and allows us to compute geographic segment corruption risk for a larger sample. The second method classifies segments separately for each firm using the median geographic segment 2006 World Bank corruption rating for only those countries in which the firm operates. By controlling for the countries in which a firm elects to operate, this second approach mitigates the concern that unobservable differences in a firm's selection of countries of operation generate differences in performance, and ensures that a firm is equally represented across both the high-and low-risk categories. However, it also requires that firms report sales for at least two geographic segments. Forty-seven firms have data for only one geographic segment and, therefore, are excluded from this test.
Profitability. Geographic segment profits are not consistently available for the sample firms and, as a result, we are unable to perform the same segment analysis for profitability as for sales growth. Therefore, we measure firm changes in profitability subsequent to the construction of the anticorruption rating variable by the change in firm ROE from 2007 to 2010 (DROE), where ROE is defined as net income over beginning-of-year shareholder's equity.
As reported in Panel C of Table 2 , mean and median sales growth for low corruption geographic segments are 3 percent. For high corruption geographic segments mean and median sales growth are 12 percent and 15 percent respectively. Mean and median DROE i are À5 percent, largely due to the financial crisis that reduced the profitability of most businesses. To test the impact of segment sales growth on profitability, we estimate the following regression model:
Res AC HI i ÃSG HI i þ e i DROE i is the change in return on equity from 2007 to 2010 for firm i. SG LO (SG HI ) are the aggregate sales growth rates for lowand high-risk geographic segments. b 2 and b 3 represent the effect of sales growth on the change in ROE in low (high) corruption segments for firms with abnormally low corruption ratings. b 4 and b 5 reflect the incremental impact of sales growth on the change in ROE for firms with high residual ratings in low and high corruption geographic segments, respectively. Table 4 reports the results of the model explaining cross-company variation in anticorruption ratings. We standardize all variables to facilitate comparing the relative economic significance of each variable. Because all variables are scaled to have a standard normal distribution with zero mean and unitary standard deviation, estimates represent the effect on the dependent variable of a one-standard-deviation increase in the independent variables. Since data on governance variables are only available for 282 of the sample firms, we report two models. The first uses all 480 firms, but excludes governance variables, and the second includes the governance variables, but is limited to 282 observations.
IV. RESULTS
Explaining Variation in Anticorruption Ratings
The overall explanatory power of the model excluding governance variables is 45.4 percent in Table 4 , and many of the independent variables are statistically and economically significant. The explanatory power is very similar to that generated using country and industry fixed effects, in addition to the same firm-specific variables that we use in Table 4 , suggesting that the identified industry and country variables incorporated in the model capture much of the variation in disclosed anticorruption efforts due to country and industry factors.
The enforcement and monitoring variables in Table 4 are all statistically and economically significant. Home country enforcement has the largest estimated coefficient of 0.303, implying that a one-standard-deviation increase in home country enforcement increases a company's residual rating by 0.303. The U.S. listing and Big 4 auditor variables are also positive and significant, indicating that non-U.S. firms that subject themselves to U.S. anticorruption laws and enforcement and firms that hire Big 4 auditors have higher anticorruption ratings. Finally, firms that have experienced past enforcement actions for corruption have higher ratings.
The variables reflecting firms' exposure to corruption are also significant in Table 4 . The positive home country corruption estimate implies that firms from less corrupt home countries have higher ratings. The effect of host country corruption is negative, but insignificant. The positive industry risk estimate indicates that firms operating in high-risk industries disclose more anticorruption efforts.
For the model that includes governance variables (but uses 282 rather than 480 observations), the findings in Table 4 are remarkably similar to those discussed above. Except for the Big 4 auditor estimate, the same risk and enforcement/monitoring estimates are statistically reliable and economically comparable. Among the governance variables themselves, the percentage of independent directors is positive and significant, implying that an increase in the percentage of independent directors is associated with an increase in anticorruption ratings. It is difficult to discern, however, whether this reflects stronger anticorruption efforts promulgated by an independent board, or increased cheap talk as independent boards and managers collectively seek to manage regulatory risks related to corruption. The CEO-Chairman duality and board attendance variables are insignificant. 22 Finally, in Table 4 , only a subset of the firm-specific control variables are significant in both models that include and exclude governance variables. Estimates for percent of foreign sales and English reporting indicate that firms that are internationally diversified and with English as their primary language have higher ratings. The negative country disclosure estimate is inconsistent with prior research and suggests that ratings are not driven solely by disclosure practices. Estimates for ***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, using a two-tailed test. This table presents estimates from an ordinary least squares (OLS) model where the dependent variable is ratings of firms' self-reported anticorruption efforts. All independent variables are defined in Table 2 and are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.
the number of segments and percent of closely held shares are significant in the model excluding the governance variables, and firm size is significant in the model that includes governance variables. But the remaining variables found to be associated with disclosure practices in past research (such as ROE, analyst following, forecast error, and accounting standard quality) are insignificant, suggesting that our dependent variable differs from other disclosure metrics. Table 5 shows coefficient estimates for the relation between subsequent corruption news stories that cite sample firms for three different years, 2008, 2009, and 2010, and residual anticorruption ratings. Across all three models, the coefficients on residual ratings are negative and significant, indicating that firms with higher residual ratings are subsequently cited less frequently in the press for corruption. The 2008 coefficient indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in residual ratings decreases the number of corruption articles citing sample firms by 1.5, or 15 percent. The corresponding economic effect for 2009 is À18 percent, and for 2010 is À46 percent, although this last effect is less statistically reliable. In untabulated tests, we exclude firms that have zero corruption article cites in 2007 and that, therefore, could not decrease cites through anticorruption efforts. Excluding these firms increases the statistical significance of our results and the economic effects to 21, 25, and 31 percent for 2008, 2009, and 2010, respectively. The coefficients on the control variables in Table 5 have the expected signs. Firms that receive more media attention have more cites in corruption articles, and firms with past corruption news cites tend to have more future cites. The coefficient on past corruption cites is less than 1, suggesting that firms facing media scrutiny over corruption take measures to combat the charges, leading to a decline in future cites. Consistent with this mean reversion, the coefficient on past cites decreases as the dependent variable is measured further into the future, from 0.717 when the dependent variable is year 2008 articles, to 0.195 when the dependent variable is year 2010 articles. 23
Anticorruption Ratings and Subsequent Corruption Articles
Anticorruption Ratings and Sales Growth
Results of tests of the relation between three-year-ahead sales growth and residual anticorruption ratings are presented in Table 6 . Because of missing geographic segment data, the sample decreases to 350 firms. The table reports average geographic segment sales growth rates from 2008 to 2010 (after the ratings were constructed) for firms with positive and negative residual ratings (estimated using the model in Table 4 ) in geographic segments with high and low corruption risk.
Panel A of Table 6 reports results when segments are classified according to their corruption relative to the median corruption ratings of all 47 geographic segments in the sample. This classification maximizes the difference in the corruption ***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, using a two-tailed test. The dependent variable, CorruptArticles (2008, 2009, or 2010) , is the number of media articles that appear in major business publications and allege that a company has been involved in a corruption scandal during calendar year 2008 , 2009 , or 2010 . Res_AC (2007 is the residual anticorruption rating, from the OLS model estimated in Table 4 . Larger values represent companies with more transparency around their anticorruption efforts. TotalArticles (year t) is the number of articles in which a company appears in major business publications. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.
level across the high and low corruption risk categories. However, the two corruption risk categories can include very different firms, potentially allowing unobservable firm characteristics to drive differences in sales growth across high and low corruption risk categories. Panel B addresses this concern by classifying firms' geographic segments using their corruption score relative to the median corruption score of only segments where the firm operates. This ensures that each firm is included in both the high and low corruption risk categories and, therefore, that the influence of other firm characteristics on segment sales growth is mitigated. It is equivalent to holding the firm constant and identifying changes in sales growth across segments with different corruption levels. Difference-in-differences Estimate p-value 12.3%** 0.036 n ¼ 412 firm-geographic segments, for 72 firms operating in 38 geographic segments ***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, using a two-tailed test. In Panel A, firms' geographic segments are classified as having high/low corruption risk if their corruption score is above/below the median for all sample firm segments. In Panel B, geographic segments are classified as having high/low corruption risk if their corruption score is above/below the median for the firm's own segments. In Panel C, firms' geographic segments are classified as having high/low corruption risk if their corruption score is above/below the median for all sample firm segments of undiversified firms in commodity sectors. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level.
The findings are similar using both approaches. Table 6 , Panel A shows that in low corruption geographic segments, the sample firms with low residual ratings have future sales growth rates of À4.3 percent versus 0.1 percent for firms with high residual ratings. However, the difference between these estimates is not statistically significant, indicating that in low corruption geographic segments, firms' residual ratings have little impact on their subsequent sales growth. Findings in Panel B, using the within-firm classification of segments as high and low corruption, are similar. As an aside, the weak sales growth rates for the sample firms during sample period (2008) (2009) (2010) likely reflect the economic downturn that affected developed economies during these years.
In contrast, the future segment sales growth rates for firms with abnormally high and low residual ratings diverge sharply in high corruption geographic segments. Table 6 , Panel A shows that firms with high residual ratings have sales growth of only 2.6 percent, compared to 14.1 percent for those with low residual ratings. The difference is statistically significant. More importantly, the difference-in-differences estimate comparing sales growth for firms with high and low residual ratings in high and low corruption geographic segments is 15.9 percent and is both statistically and economically significant. The results in Panel B are similar, with the difference-in-differences estimate being slightly lower at 13.3 percent. This is not surprising, as the average difference in the World Bank corruption ratings for geographic segments classified as high and low corruption in Panel A is 1.15, versus 0.95 in Panel B. The difference between these mean estimates is not statistically significant.
Because these univariate tests do not control for mean reversion in sales growth, documented in prior studies (see Healy and Palepu 2008) , we reestimate the tests using a multivariate approach that controls for past-three-year sales growth. The results (untabulated) are similar to those presented above, generating a difference-in-differences in growth rates of between 16 percent and 17.4 percent. Consistent with prior research, we find strong evidence of mean reversion in sales, represented by a significant negative estimate on lagged sales growth.
Since these findings use residual rather than total anticorruption efforts, they cannot be attributed to differences in country or industry risk exposures, or to differences in enforcement or monitoring effects across the sample firms. Also, the differencein-differences test implies that the sales growth difference cannot be attributed to a firm effect that drives growth in both clean and corrupt countries. Finally, the persistence of sales growth differences when geographic segments are classified as high and low corruption using within-firm comparisons implies that the findings are not attributable to differences in the propensity for high and low anticorruption rated firms to operate in corrupt countries.
Anticorruption Ratings, Profitability, and Sales Growth Table 7 reports multivariate estimates of the relation between performance and residual anticorruption ratings. We estimate the relation between sales growth and changes in ROE using both the across-firm (Table 6 , Panel A) and the withinfirm (Table 6 , Panel B) segment classifications. Across all specifications, the change in ROE is positively (negatively) related to sales growth in low (high) corruption geographic segments. The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are economically interesting. Using the across-firm segment classification, the estimates imply that for the median sample company, a 10 percent increase in sales in low corruption geographic segments increases ROE by 17 basis points (0.10 Ã 1.738), whereas a 10 percent increase in sales in high corruption segments decreases ROE by 7 basis points (0.10 Ã 0.733). Using the withinfirm geographic segment classification, the estimates imply that a 10 percent increase in sales in low corruption geographic segments increases ROE by 14 basis points, whereas a comparable sales increase in high corruption segments decreases ROE by 10 basis points. Therefore, the effect on company ROE from increasing sales in high versus low corruption segments is À24 basis points.
However, the relation between sales growth and profitability differs for firms with high and low residual anticorruption ratings. To estimate this effect, we interact high and low corruption geographic segment sales growth with an indicator variable for firms with positive residual ratings. The estimates in Table 7 for sales growth in high corruption geographic segments, which represent the effects for firms with low residual ratings, continue to be negative and become statistically significant. They imply that for these firms, a 10 percent sales increase in high corruption geographic segments is accompanied by a decline in company ROE of about 30 or 24 basis points, depending on whether we classify segment corruption within or across firms.
But the interaction effect in Table 7 for firms with high residual anticorruption ratings and sales growth in corrupt geographic segments is positive and significant. The sum of the two estimates, which represents the overall marginal effect for firms with high residual ratings, is insignificant. Firms with high residual ratings that grow sales in high corruption geographic segments, therefore, do so without lowering their ROE. For geographic segments where corruption is low, sales growth has a similar impact on ROE for both high and low residual rating firms.
These findings imply that firms with low residual anticorruption ratings grow businesses in high corruption geographic segments at the cost of reducing their ROE. Since the valuation of a company increases in both ROE and the growth rate of the Res AC HI i is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for firms that have residual anticorruption ratings (estimated using the model in Table 4 ) higher than the median sample firm, and 0 otherwise.
SG LO i and
SG HI i are the sales growth rates for geographic segments with low/high corruption ratings respectively if their corruption score is below/above the median for all sample firm segments (first four columns) or for the firm's own segments (last four columns).
where V is the equity value of the firm, B is the book value of equity, ROE is the long-term ROE, r is the cost of equity capital, and g B is the growth rate of the book value of equity. Using the data in Panel A of Table 6 , the average firm with high residual ratings has a weighted average sales growth of 0.85 percent per year (2.6 percent in corrupt geographic segments that comprise 30 percent of its business, and 0.1 percent in clean geographic segments that make up 70 percent of total sales). Given these sales growth rates, its expected ROE would be 28 percent (given estimates in Table 7 ). Assuming a cost of equity of 10 percent, the average high residual rating firm would have a value-to-book multiple of 2.97 (1 þ (28 percent À 10 percent)/(10 percent À 0.85 percent)). 24 In contrast, the average firm with low ratings has a higher growth rate of 1.2 percent (14.1 percent in corrupt countries that comprise 30 percent of its business, and À4.3 percent in clean countries). But its expected ROE, based on estimates in Table 7 , would be 27.4 percent. These estimates generate a value-to-book multiple of 2.98 (1 þ (27.4 percent À 10 percent)/(10 percent À 1.2 percent), virtually identical to that of its counterpart with high residual anticorruption ratings. Using estimates for the within-firm segment classification yields similar results. Therefore, the computations imply that, on average, the differences in ROE and sales growth observed for firms with high and low residual ratings have limited effect on their valuations.
Additional Analyses
Our tests attempt to control for many factors that are likely to be correlated with both corruption ratings and future firm performance. We use residual, rather than total, anticorruption efforts, to control for differences in country and industry risk exposures, and for differences in enforcement or monitoring effects across the sample firms. The persistence of the sales growth differences when geographic segment corruption is classified using within-firm comparisons suggests that the findings are not attributable to systematic differences in the countries where high and low anticorruption rating firms choose to operate. But there are a number of questions that merit discussion and further empirical analysis. Here, we describe briefly a series of tests that attempt to examine alternative explanations for the results we document. The Online Appendix A includes a more detailed discussion and tables showing the results from the empirical analyses.
Differences in product differentiation. One potential explanation for our findings is that multinationals with high residual ratings offer only differentiated high-margin products in high corruption geographic segments, whereas firms with low residual ratings offer largely low-margin undifferentiated products. Such a product mix difference could reflect a difference in anticorruption efforts if highly rated firms choose to offer differentiated products in high corruption geographic segments to increase their market power to avoid paying bribes to corrupt buyers. 25 Alternatively, it could reflect differences in comparative advantage-firms with low-end products are better able to compete in less developed (more corrupt) countries, whereas firms with high-end products are better able to compete in more developed (less corrupt) countries. Both factors could explain the slower sales growth and higher profitability for high residual rated firms in high versus low geographic segments compared to firms with low residual ratings.
To examine this explanation for our findings, we separately analyze sample firms that have more than 90 percent of their sales in one three-digit SIC code and whose products are undifferentiated commodities. The Standard & Poor's Commodity Index includes energy products, industrial metals, agricultural products, livestock products, and precious metals in commodity sectors. Of the 480 firms in our sample, 88 have 90 percent or more of their business in one of these commodity sectors, and 72 report geographic segment data required for our tests. Most of these firms operate in either the oil and gas or basic materials industries.
Panel C of Table 6 shows segment sales growth estimates for this smaller sample. The difference-in-differences estimate is 12.3 percent, which is similar to the estimates tabulated in Panels A and B, and is statistically significant. In addition, Table 7 shows that the differential relation between ROE and sales growth for high and low residual rated firms persists for the smaller sample of commodity firms. These findings suggest that the performance differences for firms with high and low residual anticorruption ratings do not reflect endogenous differences in product offerings across countries.
Corporate governance. The primary results discussed above use residuals from the model of anticorruption efforts for the full 480-firm sample. Due to data limitations that limit the sample to only 282 firms, these analyses exclude governance variables. Yet our earlier findings, using the subsample of 282 firms, indicate that firms with more independent boards have stronger anticorruption efforts. To assess whether this factor affects subsequent corruption allegations or changes in performance, we reestimate our models using residuals from the model including governance variables. All our results are unchanged.
250 largest firms. The sample includes both firms that are selected on the basis of size and firms that are selected on the basis of corruption or industry corruption risk, raising questions about whether corruption outcomes, press coverage, and firm performance vary systematically across these subsamples. To assess whether sample selection affects subsequent corruption allegations or changes in performance, we reestimate our models using residuals from the model including only the 250 largest firms. The results are very similar to those for the full sample.
Aggregation of countries to segments. Firms choose how to aggregate operating countries into geographic segments. If these aggregations are designed to reduce the disclosure and attention provided to countries with high corruption risk, then, potentially, we might be misclassifying geographic segments according to corruption risk. 26 To better understand whether such behavior takes place in our setting and whether our results are influenced by segment reporting aggregation, we identify sample firms that report at least 95 percent of their total segment sales to individual countries, rather than to geographic regions such as ''The Americas,'' ''Europe,'' ''Southeast Asia,'' ''Sub-Saharan Africa,'' ''Western Europe,'' ''Southeast Europe,'' ''South America,'' etc. The subsample also includes firms that report results for ''North America,'' since the U.S. and Canada have comparable low corruption risk. Out of the 350 firms that are used in the sales growth analysis, we identify 89 firms that satisfy these criteria. Not surprisingly, these firms are smaller compared to the overall sample in this study (average total assets $17 billion). In general, the findings are qualitatively similar to those reported for the larger sample, although the media analysis results are, at best, weakly statistically significant, perhaps because the media are less likely to disseminate news for smaller companies.
TI ratings. Several questions arise from our use of TI ratings as a measure of firms' anticorruption policies. First, some of the factors used by TI for generating the ratings involve rater judgment, raising questions about the reliability of the ratings and their consistency across companies. To examine this question, we reestimate our analysis using management systems as the only component of the anticorruption ratings variable. Ratings for management system disclosures require less subjectivity on the part of TI examiners than the strategy and policy ratings, which require assessment of firm commitments and the extent of policy implementation. In addition, TI investigators allocated half of the total points to management systems because they regarded these as more credible and effective than the policy and strategy segments, which could more easily be classified as public relations. Second, we have only a limited understanding of the trade-offs between the various anticorruption efforts covered in the TI metric. As a result, firms with large differences in ratings may have material differences in their anticorruption policies, but firms with smaller rating differences may effectively have equivalent policies. To assess any nonlinearity, we transform the ordinal anticorruption rating variable into quintiles. The variable takes the value 1 for firms whose ratings are in the bottom 20 percent, 2 for firms with ratings in the next lowest 20 percent, and so on. The tests are reestimated using this transformed variable. The results using both the management systems rating score and the quintiles ranks are similar to those reported in the paper.
Incentives of U.S.-listed firms. Many of our firms are U.S.-listed and, hence, subject to the FCPA. Given the higher levels of enforcement of these laws, such firms have stronger incentives for cheap talk. By reporting higher anticorruption policies (leading to higher ratings), these firms may be able to reduce regulatory penalties for corruption infractions. Therefore, we reestimate the models using only firms with U.S. equity and/or fixed income listings. If these firms' disclosures reflect only cheap talk, then their anticorruption ratings would show no relation with subsequent anticorruption allegations and sales growth. The results for these firms are similar to those for the full sample, further suggesting that cheap talk alone is not driving disclosure of anticorruption efforts. 27 Generalizability. Our study is limited because the sample is skewed toward the largest firms in the world and the data on anticorruption efforts are for just one year. To test the robustness of our results to these limitations, we collect data on disclosure of anticorruption efforts for a large set of firms around the world from Thomson Reuters ASSET4. Five variables in the ASSET4 dataset reflect disclosures on anticorruption efforts, identifying (1) whether a company has a policy against bribery, (2) whether a senior executive or board member has publicly committed to fight bribery, (3) whether it has a code of conduct that covers bribery, (4) whether it provides employees with training on how to avoid bribery, and (5) whether internal communication tools exist for employees to report bribery incidents. For each firm-year in the dataset, we construct an index of self-reported anticorruption efforts that ranges from 0 to 100 percent based on the percentage of those indicators that take the value of 1 for the years 2002-2011. This measure is far less comprehensive than the TI measure, but it allows us to analyze a larger sample of 15,503 firm-year observations, representing 2,834 unique firms from 42 countries, a wide range of industries, and multiple years. The findings are consistent with results from our primary analysis.
Changes in self-reported anticorruption efforts. The ASSET4 sample also allows us to conduct our analyses using changes rather than levels, reducing the risk that our findings are attributable to unobservable firm-level variables. We use timeseries changes in the ASSET4 anticorruption ratings to identify firms that had significant increases in their anticorruption disclosures in a specific year. Three hundred eighty-seven firms increased their anticorruption efforts index by 40 points or more in a single year (disclosing two or more additional indicators). 28 For each firm, we identified a matched control firm with an anticorruption index of 0 for all years that was from the same home country, the same Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) sub-industry, and ranked in the same size quintile. If more than one control firm was available, we selected the firm with the closest ROE match. Using these criteria, we successfully matched 71 firms, generating a matched sample of 142 firms. Although we lose observations using this approach, primarily through matching on the sub-industry and home country, the sample comprises direct competitors from the same home countries. Since we use a matched-pair design, the focus is on sample firm citations in future corruption media stories and future performance analyses; it is not possible to conduct the determinants analysis of Table 4 . In contrast to the levels analysis, we find no significant results for the media analysis. However, the sales growth findings confirm that high-rated firms grow more slowly in corrupt geographic segments. No such difference for the two samples is observed in low corruption segments. Finally, consistent with findings reported in Table 7 , we find that treatment firms have a higher relation between future sales growth in corrupt segments and ROE than the control firms.
V. CONCLUSION
We find that ratings of firms' self-reported anticorruption efforts are predictably related to enforcement and monitoring costs, such as home country enforcement, U.S. listing, Big 4 auditors, and prior enforcement actions. They are also related to industry and country corruption risks. In addition, firms with abnormally high anticorruption ratings have a lower frequency of cites in subsequent media articles on corruption. The financial implications of fighting corruption are more nuanced. Over the following three years, firms with low residual anticorruption ratings have higher sales growth in corrupt geographic segments than firms with high residual ratings. But the low residual rating firms also have a negative relation between changes in ROE and sales growth in these high corruption geographic segments. No such decline occurs for firms with high residual ratings, or for either rating type in geographic segments where corruption is low. Importantly, the valuation effects of these performance differences are modest, as the two effects are offsetting. Taken as a whole, we interpret the findings as evidence that selfreported anticorruption efforts reflect more than cheap talk by the sample companies.
However, a number of caveats apply to our findings. First, our tests rely on the TI ratings of anticorruption efforts. These have several limitations. They reflect reported anticorruption efforts, not their actual efforts; they are implemented for a small non-random sample of firms for a single year; they are subject to our limited understanding of the trade-offs between different elements of anticorruption efforts; and they could be constructed inconsistently across firms. Second, the tests focus on multinational firms. Such firms are likely to have more leverage to fight corruption than local firms. Therefore, our results might not generalize to a sample of local firms. Third, we test the effect on sales growth and profitability over the next three years. The effect of anticorruption efforts on sales growth and profitability could differ over longer time horizons. Finally, given the lack of theory about factors that drive anticorruption efforts, we recognize that questions remain about the impact of correlated omitted variables. Although our findings are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests, we recognize that, as with any empirical analysis, those efforts are inevitably incomplete.
Not surprisingly, given the formative stage of firm-level research on corruption, our findings raise many more questions for future study than we are able to answer. For example, what factors, other than monitoring/enforcement and risk exposures, explain the differences in firms' self-reported efforts to fight corruption? To what extent do they reflect the personal values of the top executive? Prior research argues that managerial experiences, values, and cognitive styles affect corporate decisions (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2010; Davidson, Dey, and Smith 2012) . Does the level of competition from local firms influence multinational firms' ratings and corruption policies in their countries? Finally, what are the most effective methods of combating corruption at the firm level? We believe that these and other firm-level questions are likely to provide fruitful areas for future research.
